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Dynamics of financial marketsIn order to investigate the dynamics of financial markets we have developed a simplemulti agent network model for a basic financial system, comprising of three fundamentaltypes of agents: Banks, Investors and Borrowers (see Methods section for details). Ourapproach to modeling this system is inspired by the modeling of societies andecosystems, in which a key role is played by the virtual intra and interdependence ofspecies (1)(2)(3)(4). This translates in our model into a focus on: (i) the dynamics ofinfection of business strategies within the banking sector and of culture disseminationwithin the investment and fund management community, and (ii) the topological aspectsof the network of interactions.
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Abstract: The economical world consists of a highly interconnected and
interdependent network of firms(1)(2)(3). Here we develop temporal and structural
network tools to analyze the state of the economy. Our analysis indicates that a strong
clustering can be a warning sign. Reduction in diversity, which was an essential aspect
of the dynamics surrounding the crash in 2008, is seen as a key emergent feature
arising naturally from the evolutionary and adaptive dynamics inherent to the
financial markets. Similarly, collusion amongst construction firms in a number of
regions in Japan in the 2000s can be identified with the formation of clusters of
anomalous highly connected companies.
2In order to focus more clearly on the influence of the collective action of agents, and theirinteraction amongst themselves on system stability, we built this model in a manner thatit does not required detailed financial and economic data as inputs, relying solely onhistorical interest rates. This is not a limitation of the approach, but a simplification toenable a clearer interpretation of results.Our model differs from traditional quantitative finance in that it does not focus on risktypes (credit, market, liquidity, etc.) or risk quantification (for example Value-at-Risk,Probability of Default, Loss-Given-Default,)(5). Instead, our model makes use of riskparameters purely as a relative measure to rank agents, and to ensure that therelationship between expected losses and expected returns is always consistentlymaintained. Our approach also differs from traditional behavioral finance models thattypically focus on individual behavior as the drivers for decision making(6). The presentmodel contains elements similar to previous work such as Johansen, Ledoit, andSornette(7) in introducing feedback mechanisms and copies of behaviors. It differs inbeing concerned with a broader general system dynamics, and in particular the relationbetween diversity and stability. Our network analysis is also inspired by the workcarried out by Inaoka, Ninomiya, Taniguchi, Shimizu and Takayasu(8) on the networks ofbanking transactions, differing to the extent that we focus on the relationship betweenbank and investor instead of the inter-banking transactions.We find typically that the dynamics of a collection of interdependent financial agentsleads to strong homogeneity in the longer term, and that this lack of diversity leads to theemergence of unstable periods. In regulatory terms this suggests that the currentexisting rules in the most developed countries may in effect contribute to the instabilityof the financial system, by enforcing homogeneity across business models and thereforereducing diversity.Figure 1 compares the emergence of banking crisis over circa 900 model simulations totwo pieces of US economic data: (i) the number of bankruptcies (failures and financialassistances) in the banking sector in the US, (ii) the years of negative GDP growth(contraction) seen in the US economy. This is done for a period from January 1973 toDecember 2011. As an input, our model uses actual US base rate movements, andcomputes the number of bankruptcies under adaptive evolutionary dynamics forinvestors and banks. To isolate the importance of the evolutionary aspects of thedynamics, we also include the results calculated from a purely conventional marketdynamics, excluding the evolutionary dynamics.This figure shows that only when evolutionary dynamics is included in the model, do theresults compare well with the sequences of bankruptcies in the US, as well as the periodsof economic contraction. We note that for simulations resulting in the emergence of twocrises, the results are also significantly in line with the beginning of the two periods ofbanking crisis1 in the US, that are normally described in the economic literature: (i) the
1 We note that it is important to make a distinction between financial crisis and banking crisis. Banking crises are normally associatedwith failures and bankruptcies of financial institutions within a country, whereas financial crises normally have a broaderconnotation involving various economic factors (GDP, unemployment, currency, trade, etc.). The Emerging market crisis in the late90s, for example, had significant impact in the US and other Western Economies, but did not result in a higher number of bankingfailures within the US.
3“Savings and Loans Crisis”, which is normally dated from the early 80s to the early 90s(9),and (ii) the more recent “Subprime Crisis” dated 2007(10).In contrast, no crisis arises when the evolutionary dynamics are not present which is inline with the expectations based solely on economic theory of rational marketequilibrium.Figure 2 provides us with snapshots of the underlying structure of our simulatedbanking network for a single model realization under evolutionary dynamics,characterized by crises occurring in 1981 and 2008. For comparative purposes, we alsopresent the results of a separate single realization without evolutionary dynamics.It is clear that the adaptive behavior of agents, arising from the evolutionary dynamics,leads to the emergence of a dominant strategy, and consequently to a significantreduction in the diversity of bank strategies. Those dynamics also give rise to increasedinvestors’ return expectations. These effects are particularly pronounced during theperiod before the second (and larger) financial crisis.The financial crises only arise as a result of the evolutionary dynamics, and furthermorethe model suggests that the nature of each crisis is more complex than a simple linearrelationship between the levels of diversity and the market conditions. Prior to bothfinancial crises, the emergence of a dominant strategy can be observed (see Figure 2B).However, there are marked differences between these crises arising within the modeloutput: (i) As it can be noted in Figure 2, the number of banks with the dominantstrategy during the first crisis is significantly smaller than the number of banks with thedominant (and different) strategy in the second crisis; (ii) The dominant strategyaccounts for only 30% of all bankrupt agents during the period of the first crisis,compared to a total of 90% for the second crisis. In addition, relative to the otherstrategies, the dominant strategy for the first crisis is conservative, whereas thedominant strategy for the second crisis is aggressive.Those results are qualitatively consistent with the fundamental nature of the actual UScrises given that the “Loan and Savings Crisis” mostly affected Thrifts (i.e. US financialinstitutions that accepts saving deposits and invest and invest in mortgages and personalloans) which were supposed to be conservative institutions with varied profiles. Incontrast the “Subprime Crisis” resulted in most financial institutions adopting similarstrategies, either originating subprime loans or investing in higher yield mortgage bondsthat were used to fund those loans.In addition, Figure 2B indicates that the dominant strategy leading to the second crisisinitially started its development during the mid 90s, a date which is fully consistent withthe real life beginnings of the subprime mortgage market in the USA(11).2In the real financial world we also observe that reduction of diversity is partially a resultof mergers and acquisitions. One striking statistic is the significant reduction of the
2 We observed qualitatively similar behaviour for those runs within similar two crisis model realisations. Whilst outside of the scopeof this paper, we plan to expand our work in the future studying in more details the relationship between the crisis, changes to thenetwork dynamics, and the emergence of the dominant strategies.
4numbers of financial entities in the USA from 13,976 in 1973 to 6,290 in 20113. Inaddition, the gradual erosion of regulation separating financial activities, such as themore liberal interpretation and subsequent repudiation of the Glass-Steagall Act, mayalso have contributed to a higher banking similarity.One point to note is that whereas within the model, many banks with the same strategyremain distinct, in practice this may correspond to mergers and acquisitions amongbanks. As a result, some agents within the dominant strategy may in the real world formpart of a single financial group.To summarize, our model suggests that a valuable indicator of loss of systemic stabilitycan be obtained from a bank network analysis and that, moreover, attempts to forecastthe trajectory of the financial system must take into account the adaptive evolutionaryaspects of the financial entities.
Japanese firm networkTo further demonstrate the potential of topological aspects of the network analysis as adiagnostic tool, in this Section we expand our analysis into a real world network dataset.Specifically, we analyzed an exhaustive set of data from business dealings of Japanesefirms in 2005 provided by Tokyo Shoko Research, Ltd. (TSR). The Japanese inter-firmnetwork consists of about one million companies interconnected through nearly 4million links, corresponding to declared transactions of goods or services between firms.We are able to identify collusion between construction firms that took place in certainregions of Japan(12)(13)(14) through a percolation study of the Japanese firm network.. Eventhough this collusion during the 2000s is now well known, it was not discovered at thetime. If such an analysis had been applied back then, the collusion could have beendetected as events were unfolding.We test the stability of the network in two ways. Our first test consists of removing thecompany with the largest number of connections and with probability p removing theneighbors of this company followed by removing the neighbors of the neighbors withprobability p and so forth. We find that when p exceeds the value pc = 0.012 this processpropagates throughout the whole network. From analyzing the Japanese firmbankruptcy data we can evaluate the probability of contagious failure as p=0.010, whichis lower than the critical value but worryingly close to it to be of concern as thebankruptcy of a major firm might lead to a collapse of the entire economical network.In our second test we use the standard procedure for complex networks(15) of graduallyremoving firms in descending order starting with the most connected companies first. Byremoving about 27% of the most well connected firms the Japanese firm network fallsapart losing the connectivity across the whole country. This value is significantly abovethe corresponding value of 24% for randomized networks having the same distributionof link numbers.
3 Source: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation – FDIC – Table CB14.
5The enhanced strength of the real network is to a large extent a natural and healthyconsequence of sector structure and collaboration. However, an inspection of thegeographical distribution of the companies remaining in the network at the threshold fordisintegration, see Figure 3, reveals inappropriate practices. In Figure 3a an example ofcompanies remaining at the threshold in the case of randomized artificial network isshown, in which companies are distributed widely proportional to the populationdensity. On the other hand in Figure 3b, too many of the surviving companies areconstruction companies located in a few restricted areas, Wakayama prefecture, Nagoyacity and Fukushima prefecture. Our analysis has uncovered the well-known collusionaffairs amongst construction firms, which took place in parallel in Wakayama, Nagoyaand Fukushima around 2005, see e.g. ((12),(13), and (14)).
Method(1) The Financial Market Network and Dynamics.The financial market is represented by three basic agents: Investors, Banks andBorrowers. The interaction among these agents is simulated on a cycle by cycle basis,with each cycle representing a month from January 1973 to December 2011.We provide in Figure 4 below, a schematic representation of a Bank, and related cashflows for each cycle.a) Financial Markets Under “Conventional Dynamics”In Figure 5, we provide a schematic representation of the methodology we define as“Conventional Dynamics”, together with a summary describing those dynamics. For amore detailed description, we refer the reader to Appendix 1 of this document and theformulae therein. For clarity, a list of relevant variables that appear in the model ispresented in Appendix 2.Investors are on the top of the economic structure, providing funding to banks. Eachinvestor is characterized by their investment return expectation Rex௜௡ (ݐ), and their totalwealth. The feedback from actual returns interacting with expected returns generates aninvestor risk appetite parameter ݍ௜௡ (ݐ), according to the standard deviation of thedownside risk (16).Based on the relative magnitude of their risk appetite parameter, Investors are thenranked and aggregated into a number of 11 categories of rating preferences. The numberor categories aims to replicate the investment grade ratings assigned by internationalrating agencies, which ranges from AAA to BBB-. An investor’s wealth is divided intosmaller investment portions, or tranches ( ܶݎ௜௡ ௡ - see Appendix for details of notation),based on a pre-defined concentration limit.Banks are the intermediate agents within the economic structure, capturing cash flowsfrom investors and placing loans to borrowers or within the interbank market.Banks are characterized by their (i) Capital Amount, (ii) Target Shareholder Return, (iii)Target Capital Ratio, and (iv) Bonus Ratio. For each of the banks, financial data and flows
6are structured through basic accounting principles as demonstrated in Figure 4. A Bank’sstrategy is given by the sum of Target Shareholder Return and Bonus Ratio (retained to 4decimal places).Banks are ranked and aggregated into 11 rating categories as a function of their TargetCapital Ratio and Target Shareholder Return. The Target Capital Ratio also drives theborrowing limits of each bank. Banks go bankrupt when their Actual Capital Ratio isbelow the regulatory minimum requirement of 8% and require financial assistance whenthey can no longer capture monies from investors.Monies are allocated from Investors to Banks through a selection process, which beginsby randomly selecting an Investor tranche, ܶݎ௜௡ ௡. Banks are then ordered based on theabsolute difference between their rating category and the investor rating preference; theprobability that the tranche is invested is then given by a function of the closeness ofthose ratings.A similar process is followed in relation to the allocation of monies from Banks to Loans,with the probability of investment derived as a function of the closeness between theprice of the Loan and the Banks required return (=Benchmark Return).The Cost of Borrowing is derived from the investors return expectations, ܴ ݁ݔ௜௡ (ݐ), andthe offer and cash demands for each of the rating categories. The Cost of Borrowing,together with the Target Shareholder Return, generate the Banks’ required return.Loans are the representation of borrowers, and it is their demand that drives thecirculation in the system. The loans are characterized by a relative performanceparameter lsq (where 0 < lsq < lsqmax). A low value of lsq(t) indicates a low probability ofdefault, while a high value of lsq would signify a mortgage that has a high probability ofdefault. The relative performance parameter drives the probability of default of the loanat redemption, as well as the Price of the Loan at origination.The parameter lsq is expressed by the cumulative distribution function of a log-normaldistribution, as below:
q୪ୱ (t) = 12 erfcቌlnቀ5 ୫ ୟ୶(௟௦)ାଵି௟௦୫ ୟ୶(௟௦) ቁ− ߤ(ݐ)√2ߪଶ ቍ
The parameter σଶ represents the variance of the distribution and it is fixed at 0.5,
whereas μ represents the mean of the distribution. The changes to the parameter ߤ is derived from monetary policy, namely the changes tothe Base Rate ir(,t), where we have used the actual US data, through the followingformula:
ߤ(ݐ) = ln(ir(t) + 1) ∗ ܿ, where c is a scaling parameter equal to 2.71.
7a) Evolutionary Dynamics
We then modify the Bank and Investor agents through the mechanism of CultureDissemination within the Investors’ Community and Infection of the Bank’s BusinessStrategy.Investors are ordered based on their actual returns achieved over the last 24 months,and the benchmark level is equivalent to that of the investor within the 40th centile fromthe most to least profitable. Investors below this benchmark adjust their InRex accordingto the following formula:
ܴ ݁ݔ௜௡ (ݐ) = ܴ ݁ݔ௜௡ (ݐ− 1) + ܽ4 (݁௕∗௜௥(௧))
The changes in the investment return expectations Rex௜௡ (ݐ) of Investors is modeledthrough a modified version of the Axelrod model for the dissemination of culture(17)(18).This is applied in the model using a stochastic process in which every investor earningreturns below the benchmark has a probability of increasing Rex௜௡ (ݐ) towards thebenchmark. Performances above benchmark do not result in changes Rex௜௡ (ݐ) given that,as described above, it is assumed that investors evaluate risk and returns on the basis ofthe typical standard deviation of downside risk.The parameters a and b are set at 0.02891 and -0.2168, regulating the speed ofmovement towards benchmark.The process of less successful banks copying the business strategies of the moresuccessful is inspired by the bacterial conjugation process(19), where the TargetShareholder Returns and Bonus Ratio parameters are copied from the most profitableBank and replicated into the less successful one if those are higher. The model assumes auniform probability of infection of the business strategy for all bank agents at 1% peryear.The replication of the bkSR(t) and bkBN(t) parameters is based on the principle that withinthe Financial Markets, the performance is fundamentally judged on a bank’s return onemployed capital, and the ability to pay staff bonuses so that both external and internalstakeholders are satisfied.
(2) The analysis of the Japanese firm network.The disintegration analysis is done by first removing firms one by one in descendingorder (i.e. the largest sale firm first, then the second largest, etc). The ratio of the numberof removed firms over the total number of firms is the control parameter, which we call f.After each removal, we calculate Q, the size of the largest strongly connected cluster(LSCC) as the order parameter, where "strongly connected cluster" means the set ofnodes (=firms) which are connected mutually by some business relation (buy or sell).
8The critical point is defined by the value of f_c, which satisfies the relation, Q decreasesproportional to a power of (f_c -f).This is the ordinary percolation phase transition, for f smaller than f_c the LSCC is largeenough that it is spanning over the whole country. For f larger than f_c the LSCC is verysmall, namely, the network is totally broken into small pieces. The fact that the value of
f_c for the real network is significantly larger than the randomized case implies thatsmaller sale firms tend to have business relations with smaller sale firms in the samelocation. Bid-rigging emerges in the analysis as the extreme limit of this tendency.The bottom panel in Figure 3 is for the real business network and the top panel refers toan artificial randomized network. In the randomized network, a link connecting a pair offirms is swapped with another randomly chosen link. In more detail, assume that a firmA sends money to a firm B, and a firm C sends money to a firm D, then by swapping thelinks, money flows from A to D, and C to B. By repeating this random swapping of linksmillions of times we have a randomized network in which the degree distribution isinvariant. In the randomized network the critical point is lower and there remains morefirms at the critical point of disintegration reached by removing firms in descendingorder of sales. Note that in both randomized and the real network the dots representfirms which constitute one connecting cluster by trading interaction.
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Figure 1. Crisis Mapping from Evolutionary Dynamics: Plot A shows the frequency of crisis
and the relative number of times that each type of crisis scenario occurs. The front floor (dark blue)
indicates the distributions when evolutionary dynamics are present with realisations resulting in 1 or 2
crises are by far the most common. The back floor (green) showing the results without dynamics is
entirely distributed into the first block (no crisis), indicating that market dynamics are an essential
feature in order to see crises occur. Plot B illustrates the time line of crises as predicted by the model
including the evolutionary dynamics for 1 crisis (light purple) and 2 crisis (light yellow) simulations.
Time is shown vertically, increasing downwards, while the horizontal axis denotes different realizations
of the model. A crisis is defined when >2% of the Bank agents fail or require financial assistance over a
year, which corresponds to the historical average registered in the first and second US banking crisis
over the simulation period4. The first crisis in a given realization is shown by a maroon line, the second
in orange. Plot C shows an indicative comparison to actual economic data for the US, showing: (left)
the years in which the US real GDP registered negative growth5, and (right) the number of bankruptcies
and financial assistances for US banks6 on a log scale, with the red data points representing the periods
of crisis as defined by FDIC(9)(10). It is noted that the model results lie favourably within the range
where crises occur. Plot D illustrates the probability distributions vs. time, showing: (left) a single
crisis, (middle) the first of two crises, and (right) the second of two crises; background color (cf. Plot B).
Simulations (1,2,....,n), where n = 855
(96% of total simulations)
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Figure 2. Effect of evolutionary dynamics upon network evolution: Plot A shows the
comparison of Investor and Bank Strategies at four ten year intervals when evolutionary dynamics is
neglected (left column) and included (right column). For the total network at each time, 1% of constituent
entities are selected at random and each entity, i.e. Investors and Banks, is represented by circles, with
transactions between these entities denoted by lines. For the Banks, colour is used to represent the
strategy, such that the top three strategies are denoted by red, blue and green respectively. The remaining
Bank strategies are shown on a scale of light to dark orange. The size of the circles represents the size of
the Banks' deposits at each time. Investors are coloured on a black and white scale, indicating a low
(black) to high (white) risk appetite. The size of the circles represents Investors' amounts. It is clear that as
time progresses, the evolutionary dynamics leads to the emergence of a dominant strategy (large red
circle, bottom right plot) and an increase in Investor return expectations. Plot B indicates the evolution of
the dominant Bank Strategies. The coloured lines represent each of the strategies that become dominant
at a certain stage during the whole model realisation period (horizontal axis). For a given strategy, the line
is continuous during the period when that strategy is dominant, and dotted otherwise. The vertical axis
represents the number of Bank Agents with a given strategy as a fraction of the total number of active
Bank Agents; the shadowed vertical bars mark the years where crises emerge.
Top Panel
Bottom Panel
Figure 3. Japanese Firms Network Mapping
construction, blue: manufacturing, yellow: wholesale, green: services, black: others)
threshold, as it would be if the interconnectedness were random. The bottom panel shows the actual
distribution showing concentration far beyon
prefecture near the big city Osaka. The analysis reveals that construction firms have excess inter
connections. This is an effect of illegal bid
in the network at the critical thre
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: The top panel shows the distribution of firms
d the level justified by population density in the Wakayama
-rigging, which reduces the degree of the firms and
shold.
(red:
across Japan at the
-
leaves them
Figure4. Schematic Representation of a Bank Agent and Money Flows
from Investors, and allocate those to Borrowers. Any
to be a Market Placement. A Bank’s Capital and Reserves are deemed to be retained in Cash or
Equivalents. Dividends and Bonuses represent outflows of the Reserves.
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surplus between Deposits and Lending is considered
: Banks capture monies
Figure5. Process Map for
processes carried out by the model for a given cycle. This excludes the “Evolutionary Dynamics” elements
of the full model simulations. See Appendix for a full description and formulae associated to each process.
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“Conventional Dynamics”. The figure shows the key calculations and
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Appendices
Appendix 1 – Modelling Financial Markets under “Conventional Dynamics”To supplement the overview of the methodology for modelling financial markets under“Conventional Dynamics” given in Figure 5, the following table gives a detaileddescription of this methodology and relevant formulae. As described in the main text,there are three basic market agents: Banks, Investors, and Borrowers, the latter of whichare represented below via the behavior of the Loans market.For convenience, a list of the variables appearing the methodology is presented inAppendix 2, which may prove useful to consult in parallel.
Entity Operation Method (if applicable)
Banks 1. Rating AssignmentBanks are ranked as a function of theirTarget Capital Ratio [bkTCR(t)] and assigneda Rating [bkRT(t)] ranging from 1 to 10(with the highest ratio corresponding to arating of 1).
bkRT is then adjusted downwards by onenotch if the Target Shareholder Return[bkSR(t)] is less than the mean of all Banks’
Target Shareholder Returns. Therefore 1≤
bkRT(t)≤11.
Investors 2. Investors Risk AppetiteInvestors’ Risk Appetite [inq(t)] is measuredthrough the standard deviation ofdownside risk.We set a period of 24 months as themeasurement period, representing theInvestor memory period.
ݍ(ݐ)௜௡ = ඨ 1݉ ෍ mൣin൫ ܴ݅௜௡ (ݐ) − ܴ ݁ݔ௜௡ (ݐ), 0൯൧ଶ௠
௧ୀଵ
where
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧
 ܴ ݁ݔ௜௡ (ݐ) = Investor investment return expectation
ܴ݅௜௡ (ݐ) = Investors actual return
݉ = 24 ݉ ݋݊ ݐℎݏ

Investors 3. Rating Preference
Investors are ranked as a function of inq(t)
and assigned into an Appetite Group
[inAG(t)] ranging from 1 to 11 (with the
lowest inq(t) in group 1).
Investors 4. Investment Tranching
The available funds to invest, ΔinF(t), aremade through a time period, tinv.
ΔinF(t) is divided into equal tranches, the nthof which is denoted by inTn(t), based on theconcentration limit (CL).Within the current run, the concentrationlimit was set at 10% (resulting in 10tranches) for each investment period.
Given that tinv equals 48 months, an
Δ ܨ௜௡ (ݐ) = ܨ௜௡ (ݐ) − ෍ Δ ܨ௜௡ ( )݅ݐ−1=݅ݐ−(݅ݐ݊ݒ−1)where ቐ ܨ݅݊ (ݐ) = Total Fund held at given time
ݐ௜௡௩ = 48 months 
Number of tranches: ݊ݐ= ଵ
஼௅
, whereܥܮequals 10%
௡ܶ(ݐ)௜௡ = Δ ܨ(ݐ)௜௡݊ݐ
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investor total wealth,inF(t) , is effectively
divided into 480 tranches.
Banks 5. Borrowing LimitsA bank’s borrowing limit [bkLim(t)]corresponds to the maximum amount it canborrow in order to preserve its TargetCapital Ratio [bkTCR(t)]. ݅ܮ ݉௕௞ (ݐ) = ܥ௕௞ (ݐ) ቆ
1
ܶܥܴ௕௞ (ݐ) − 1ቇ
Banks and
Investors
6. Cost of BorrowingThe cost of borrowing for a Bank [bkCB(t)]for the funding obtaining at the period (t)corresponds to the Base Interest Rate [ir(t)]plus Funding Spread [bkFS( bkRT, t)] for theRating [bkRT(t)].The total amounts deposited from investorsinto a bank is represented by bkTD(t)There is a direct mapping between bkRT(t)
and inAG(t).
bkFS( bkRT,t) is calculated for as a function ofthe demand from banks and offers fromwithin each rating category, and residesbetween the maximum and minimuminvestors’ expectations in accordance tothe adjacent formulae.
ܥܤ௕௞ (t) = ݅ݎ(ݐ) + ܨܵ௕௞ ( ܴܶ௕௞ ,ݐ)where:
Δ ݅ܮ ݉௕௞ (ݐ) = ݅ܮ ݉௕௞ (ݐ) − ܶܦ௕௞ (ݐ− 1),and the Investor Expectation for a given Appetite Group (with Ngroupmembers) is given by the average of the member expectations,weighted to the funds available to invest:
ܴ ݁ݔ௪௔ = 〈 ܴ ݁ݔ௜௡ ൫ ݍ(ݐ)௜௡ ∈ ܣܩ(ݐ)௜௡ ,ݐ൯〉௪
= ෌ ( ܴ ݁ݔ௜௜௡ (ݐ)ே೒ೝ೚ೠ೛௜ୀଵ ∗ Δ ܨ௜௜௡ (ݐ))
෌ Δ ܨ௜
௜௡ (ݐ)ே೒ೝ೚ೠ೛
௜ୀଵ
.
To determine the Funding Spread, we use the formula:
ܨܵ௕௞ ൫ ܴܶ௕௞ ,ݐ൯= ݎ(ݕ− ݖ) + ݓand the following conditions,
if෍ ∆ ݅ܮ ݉௕௞ ൫ ܴܶ= ܣܩ௜௡௕௞ ,ݐ൯
௕௞
< ෍ Δ ܨ௜௜௡ (ݐ) thenே೒ೝ೚ೠ೛
௜ୀଵ
:
ݖ= minൣ ܴ ݁ݔ௜௡ ൫ ݍ(ݐ)௜௡ ∈ ܣܩ(ݐ)௜௡ ,ݐ൯൧
ݕ= ܴ ݁ݔ௪௔
ݓ = minൣ ܴ ݁ݔ௜௡ ൫ ݍ(ݐ)௜௡ ∈ ܣܩ(ݐ)௜௡ ,ݐ൯൧
andݎ= ෌ ∆ ݅ܮ ݉௕௞ ൫ ܴܶ= ܣܩ௜௡௕௞ ,ݐ൯௕௞
෌ Δ ܨ௜
௜௡ (ݐ)ே೒ೝ೚ೠ೛
௜ୀଵ
;
if෍ ∆ ݅ܮ ݉௕௞ ൫ ܴܶ = ܣܩ௜௡௕௞ ,ݐ൯
௕௞
> ෍ Δ ܨ௜௜௡ (ݐ) then:ே೒ೝ೚ೠ೛
௜ୀଵ
ݖ= ܴ ݁ݔ௪௔
ݕ= maxൣ ܴ ݁ݔ௜௡ ൫ ݍ(ݐ)௜௡ ∈ ܣܩ(ݐ)௜௡ ,ݐ൯൧
ݓ = maxൣ ܴ ݁ݔ௜௡ ൫ ݍ(ݐ)௜௡ ∈ ܣܩ(ݐ)௜௡ ,ݐ൯൧
andݎ= − ෌ Δ ܨ௜௜௡ (ݐ)ே೒ೝ೚ೠ೛௜ୀଵ
෌ ∆ ݅ܮ ݉௕௞ ൫ ܴܶ = ܣܩ௜௡௕௞ ,ݐ൯
௕௞
Banks and
Investors
7. Allocating monies from Investors
to BanksAn investor tranche [ inTn(t)] is randomlyselected for investment.
If T௡௜௡ (t) < ݅ܮ ݉௕௞ (ݐ)− ܶܦ௕௞ ( ݐ− 1) then invest with probability p,
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All Banks are then ordered in a priority ofinvestment ranked on a random basis.The selected tranche has a probability ofinvesting in a Bank based on its ratingequivalence in accordance with theadjacent formulae.A similar process in then followed for eachsubsequent randomly selected tranche.
ܶܦ௕௞ (ݐ) is always capped at ݅ܮ ݉௕௞ (ݐ).
where
⎩
⎪⎪
⎨
⎪⎪
⎧
if ห ܴܶ(ݐ)௕௞ − ܣܩ(ݐ)௜௡ ห= 0 → ݌= 80%if ห ܴܶ(ݐ)௕௞ − ܣܩ(ݐ)௜௡ ห= 1 → ݌= 20%if ห ܴܶ(ݐ)௕௞ − ܣܩ(ݐ)௜௡ ห= 2 → ݌= 10%
Banks 8. Total Funding SpreadA new Total Funding Spread [bkTFS(t)] isrecalculated for each of the banks. ܶ௕௞ ܨ (ܵݐ) =
෍ ܨ௕௞ ܵ ቀ ܴܾܶ݇ , ቁ݅ ߂ ܶ௕௞ ܦ( )݅௧
௜ୀ௧ି (௧೔೙ೡିଵ)
ܶ௕௞ ܦ(ݐ)where
Δ ܶܦ௕௞ (ݐ) = ܶܦ௕௞ (ݐ) − ܶܦ௕௞ (ݐ− 1)
Banks 9. Benchmark ReturnA new benchmark return ൣ ܤܭ௕௞ (ݐ)൧iscalculated for each bank. ܤܭ௕௞ (t) =
େ್ೖ (୲)∗ ୗୖ್ೖ (୲)
ଵି ஻ே್ೖ (௧) + ܶܦ௕௞ (ݐ) ∗ ܥܤ௕௞ (ݐ)
ܥ௕௞ (ݐ) + ܶܦ௕௞ (ݐ) − ݅ݎ(ݐ)
where
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧
 ܥ௕௞ (ݐ) = Total Bankᇱs CapitalSR௕௞ (t) = Target Shareholderᇱs Return
ܤܰ௕௞ (ݐ) = Target Bonus Ratio

Banks 10. Lending Tranche
The available funds to lend,  ΔbkL(t), aremade through a time period, tinv, equivalentto the same period as the borrowing frominvestors.
ΔbkL(t) is divided into equal tranches, thenth of which is denoted by bkTn(t), based onthe thickness of the tranche (TT).Within the current run, the tranchethickness was set at 10% (resulting in 10tranches) for each investment period.Given that tinv equals 48 months, an bank’stotal lending, bkL(t), is effectively dividedinto 480 tranches.
Δ ܮ௕௞ (ݐ) = Δ ܶܦ௕௞ (ݐ)
Number of tranches: nt = 1ܶܶ , whereܶ ܶequals 10% and
௡ܶ
௕௞ (ݐ) = ௱ ௅(௧)್ೖ
݊ݐ
Loans 11. Pricing the LoanFor each cluster, indexed by ls=1, 2,..., 41,Loans are priced as a function of its RelativePerformance Parameter (lsq), the PrimeRate (pr) and a volatility factor (vol) inaccordance with the adjacent formula.
ܲܮ௟௦ (t) = ൫݌ݎ+ ݍ௟௦ ൯(1 + ݒ݋݈ )
where ൝݌ݎ= 3%
ݒ݋݈ = 20%
Banks and
Loans
12. Allocating monies from Banks to
LoansA bank tranche (bkTn(t)) is randomlyselected for investment. If ௡ܶ௕௞ (t) < ݉ ݇ݎ௟௦ − ܶܮ௟௦ (ݐ− 1) then invest with probability݌
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All Loan Clusters are then based on theproximity between the bank’s benchmarkreturn ܤܭ௕௞ (ݐ), and the Pricing of the Loanfor the cluster ܲܮ௟௦ (ݐ).The selected tranche has a probability ofinvesting in a Loan Cluster based inaccordance with the adjacent formulae(Gaussian).A similar process in then followed for eachsubsequent randomly selected tranche.Total Lending within a cluster [lsTL(t)] iscapped at the maximum potential marketfor that cluster [lsmrk].Tranches that are not allocated to loans aredeemed to be placed into the InterbankMarket for a period , tinv.
݌= ଵ
ఙ√ଶగ
݁
ି
భ
మ
ቆ
(ቚ ಳ಼್ೖ (೟)ష ಽು೗ೞ (೟)ቚష ഋ)
഑
ቇ
మ
where µ=0 and σ=1.
Banks and
Loans
13. Loan RedemptionLoans are deemed for redemption after tinv,.Income and Losses on Banks are calculatedfor each invested tranche in accordancewith the adjacent formulae.
݊ܫ ܿ௕௞ (t) =෎ ܶ݊(ݐ)ܾ݇ ∗ ܴ ݁݉ ∗ ݅ݐ݊ݐ12௡௨௠
ଵ
ݓℎ ݁݁ݎ 
⎩
⎪
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎧
 ௡ܶ(ݐ)௕௞ Invested in Loansthen Rem = ( ܲܮ௟௦ (ݐ−ݐ௜௡௩) + ݅ݎ(ݐ− ݐ௜௡௩))if ௡ܶ(ݐ)௕௞ invested in Interbankthenܴ ݁݉ = ( ݌ܵݎ+݅ݎ(ݐ− ݐ௜௡௩))withܵ݌ݎ= 1%

ܮ݋ݏݏ௕௞ (t) =෍ ( ܶ݊(ݐ)ܾ݇ ݍ௟௦ (ݐ)(1− ݁ݎ )ܿ௡
ଵwhere݁ݎ ܿ= 40%, representing recovery levels.
Banks 14. Capital RemunerationCapital is remunerated according to theadjacent formula. ܥ݅݊ ܿ௕௞ (ݐ) = ܥ௕௞ (ݐ)[ ݌ܵݎ+ ݅ݎ(ݐ)]/12
Banks
15. Bankruptcy TestFor each bank a bankruptcy test is made. Abank is deemed bankrupt when its ActualCapital Ratio [ ܣܥܴ௕௞ (ݐ)] is less than 8%and it requires financial assistance when itcan no longer attract Investors funding, sothat bkTD(t)=0.Once a Bank is deemed bankrupt, it iscompleted removed from future dynamics,whereas a Bank that requires financialassistance might return to operations.
ܣܥܴ௕௞ (ݐ) = ܥ௕௞ (ݐ)
ܥ௕௞ (ݐ) + ܶܦ௕௞ (ݐ)
if
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧
ܣܥܴ௕௞ (ݐ) < 8%, Bankܾ݇is bankrupt
ܣܥܴ௕௞ (ݐ) > 8%, Bankܾ݇continues trading
Banks 16. Interbank Market LossesInterbank deposits are not allocated toother banks on individual basis.In the event of a Bankruptcy, Banks within ܫܤ
௕௞ (ݐ) = ܶܦ௕௞ (ݐ) − ܮ௕௞ (ݐ)
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the same Rating category share the lossesthrough allocation on a pari-passu basisaccording to the formulae adjacent.
ܮ݅ݏܾ௕௞ (ݐ) = ܫܤ௕௔௡௞௥௨௣௧ ൫ ܴܶ௕௔௡௞௥௨௣௧ ,ݐ൯
∑ ܫܤ௜
௕௞ ൫ ܴܶ௕௞ ,ݐ൯ேೝೌ೟೔೙೒
௜ୀଵ
 ܫܤ௕௞ (ݐ)
Banks and
Investors
17. Bank’s Borrowing RedemptionBorrowing from Banks are deemed forredemption after tinv,.The cost for the Banks ( ܤ݋ݎ௕௞ (ݐ)) - andcorresponding Income for Investors( ݊ܫ ܿݒ௜௡ (ݐ)) - and Losses to Investors( ܮ݋ݏݏݒ௜௡ (ݐ)) are calculated for eachinvested tranche in accordance with theadjacent formulae.
ܤ݋ݎ௕௞ (ݐ) =෍ ௡ܶ௕௞ (ݐ) ܥܤ௕௞ (ݐ− ݐ௜௡௩) ݐ௜௡௩12௡௧௡ୀଵ
݊ܫ ܿݒ௜௡ (ݐ) =෍ ௡ܶ௜௡ (ݐ) ∗ ܥܤ௕௞ (ݐ− ݐ௜௡௩) ∗ ݐ௜௡௩12௡௧௡ୀଵ
ܮ݋ݏݏݒ௜௡ (ݐ) =෍ ܶݎூ௡ ௡(ݐ)
௡
ߜ௡,௕௔௡௞௥௨௣௧whereߜ௜,௝ acts as a Kronecker delta, selecting only thebankrupt banks that an Investor invested in.
Banks 18. Banks Results and DistributionA profit/loss (bkNetRes(t)) for the period foreach bank is calculated.A Bank’s Capital amount is modified by theprofit/loss, and decreased by the dividenddistribution.
ܰ ܴ݁ݐ ݁ݏ௕௞ (t) = ܰ݅݊ ܿ௕௞ (t)[1 − ܤܰ( ݌ܽ݌,ݐ)]where
ܰ݅݊ ܿ௕௞ (t)= ݊ܫ ܿ௕௞ (t) − ܮ݋ݏs௕௞ (t) − ܥ݅݊ ܿ௕௞ (ݐ) − ܮ݅ݏܾ௕௞ (ݐ)− ܤ݋ݎ௕௞ (ݐ).
ܤܰ( ݌ܽ݌,ݐ) = ቊ ܤܰ௕௞ (ݐ), ܰ݅݊ ܿ௕௞ (t) > 00, ܰ݅݊ ܿ௕௞ (t) < 0 
ܥ௕௞ (ݐ) = ܥ௕௞ (ݐ− 1) + ܰ ܴ݁ݐ ݁ݏ௕௞ (t) ∗ (1 − ܦ ݅ݒ( ݌ܽ݌))where
ܦ ݅ݒ( ݌ܽ݌) = ቊ95%, ܰ ܴ݁ݐ ݁ݏ௕௞ (t) > 00, ܰ ܴ݁ݐ ݁ݏ௕௞ (t) < 0 
Investors 19. Update of Investors Wealth
An Investor’s wealth is modified by the
profit/loss on the investments, and
decreased by a distribution ratio.
F௜௡ (ݐ) = F௜௡ (ݐ− 1) + Incv௜௡ (t) − ܮ݋ݏݏv௜௡ (t)[1 − ܦ ݅ݏ( ݌ܽ݌)]where
ܦ ݅ݏ( ݌ܽ݌) = ቊ90%, Incv௜௡ (t) > ܮ݋ݏݏv௜௡ (t)0, Incv௜௡ (t) < ܮ݋ݏݏv௜௡ (t) 
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Appendix 2 – List of Variables
Each of the three basic agents in the model have variables which represent their essential properties.
To make it clear which agent a variable is linked to, we have adopted the following notation:
ܸ ܽ݅ݎ ܾܽ ݈݁࢔(ݐ)ࡱ࢔࢚࢏࢚࢟
For the Variable above, which is dependent upon time t, Entity denotes the agent that the variable is
linked to, and takes on the values shown in the Table below.
Entity Symbol
Investor in
Bank bk
Loans ls
The symbols in, bk ls also act as labels for the entity types, e.g. in=1 for Investor number 1, in=2 for
Investor 2, and so on. The subscript index n is used to indicate a particular element within a vector
quantity. For example, the nth tranche for a Bank is denoted by bkTn; in particular, for Bank number 1
the nth tranche is given by 1Tn.
List of Variables
General
ݐ௜௡௩: Investment period
݅ݎ(ݐ): Base Interest Rate
݌ܵݎ: Spread for Interbank Market
Banks
ܶܥܴ(ݐ)௕௞ : Target Capital Ratio
ܴܶ(ݐ)௕௞ : A Bank’s Rating
݅ܮ ݉௕௞ (ݐ): Borrowing Limit
ܥܤ௕௞ (ݐ): Cost of Borrowing
ܨܵ௕௞ ൫ ܴܶ௕௞ ,ݐ൯: Banks’ Funding Spread, which is common to Banks with equal bkRT(t).
ܶܦ(ݐ)௕௞ : Total amount deposited in Banks by Investors
ܶܨܵ௕௞ (ݐ): Total Funding Spread
ܤܭ௕௞ (ݐ): Benchmark Return
ܥ௕௞ (ݐ): Bank’s Capital
ܴܵ௕௞ (ݐ): Target Shareholder’s Return
ܤܰ௕௞ (ݐ): Target Bonus Ratio
∆ ܮ௕௞ (ݐ): Funds available to Lend
௡ܶ
௕௞ (ݐ): nth tranche of Bank equity for Loans
ܶܶ: Tranche Thickness
∆௕௞ܮ: Bank’s lending in an Investment Period (see ݐ௜௡௩) to be split across a number of tranches
ܮ௕௞ : Bank’s total lending, equal to the sum of ∆௕௞ܮover all m months, and all tranches within each
month. E.g. if m=24 and there are 10 tranches per month, then ܮ௕௞ is split into 240 tranches in total.
݊ܫ (ܿݐ)௕௞ : Bank Income
ܮ݋ݏݏ(ݐ)௕௞ : Bank Loss
ܮ݅ݏܾ௕௞ (ݐ): Loss on Interbank Market
ܤ݋ݎ(ݐ)௕௞ : Amount paid due to Interest on Borrowing
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ܰ ܴ݁ݐ ݁ݏ௕௞ (ݐ): Profit/Loss
ܣܥܴ(ݐ)௕௞ : Actual Capital Ratio
ܥ݅݊ (ܿݐ)௕௞ : Remuneration of Capital
ܥܤ(ݐ)௕௞ : Cost of Borrowing
ܫܤ(ݐ)௕௞ : Amount invested into the Interbank market
Investors
ݍ௜௡ (ݐ): Investors’ Risk Appetite
ܴ ݁ݔ(ݐ)௜௡ : Investor investment return expectation
ܴ (݅ݐ)௜௡ : Investor’s actual return
m: Investor Memory Period
ܣܩ(ݐ)௜௡ : Appetite Group
ܨ௜௡ (ݐ): Total fund held at a given time
∆ ܨ௜௡ (ݐ): Available Investor funds for period tinv
௡ܶ
௜௡ (ݐ): Tranches of Investor funds
ܥܮ: Concentration Limit
݊ܫ ܿݒ௜௡ (ݐ): Investor Income
ܮ݋ݏݏ௜௡ ݒ(ݐ): Investor Loss
Loans
ܲܮ (ݐ)௟௦ : Loan price for a Loan cluster
ݍ௟௦ : Loan Relative Performance parameter
݌ݎ: Prime Rate
ݒ݋݈ : Volatility factor
݉ ݇ݎ௟௦ : Maximum potential market for a Loan cluster
